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ABSTRACT 
 The Joint Active Shooter Protection and Response (JASPR) is a DoD-proposed 
active shooter defeat system, designed to detect an active shooting, alert first responders, 
reduce response time, activate automatic door locks preventing further targeting by the 
active shooter and, as a result, decrease the number of lives lost during the shooting. 
Active shooter defeat systems have been sparsely studied in the literature, and JASPR has 
not yet been widely demonstrated to be effective. This research uses an agent-based 
model to compare lives lost during an active shooting with and without a JASPR system 
present. This research models how many total deaths there are, on average, according to 
the active shooter’s choice of entrance location into a simulated building, shooter 
probability of hit, shooter firing rate, whether the shooter suicides at a random interval 
after the first shot, response time of first responders, number of bystanders in the vicinity 
of an active shooting, and whether a JASPR system is present. Analysis of the model 
results indicate that JASPR presence, shooter’s choice of entrance location into the 
building, and whether the shooter suicides were the most critical in determining how 
many total lives were lost across 45,000 model replications. The results of this research 
are intended to help decision makers prioritize where and how an active shooter defeat 
system such as JASPR might be best deployed. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. RESEARCH PROBLEM ..........................................................................2 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................3 
C. THESIS STRUCTURE .............................................................................3 
II. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................5 
A. PREVIOUS RESEARCH INTO JASPR .................................................5 
B. JASPR COMPONENTS ...........................................................................6 
1. Alert Beacons ..................................................................................7 
2. Emergency Duress Buttons ...........................................................8 
3. LED Marquees ...............................................................................8 
4. Standalone Light and Sound Signals ...........................................9 
5. Gunshot Detection System ..........................................................10 
6. Squad Tracking System ...............................................................10 
7. Automatic Door Locking System ................................................11 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................13 
A. TYPICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTING .....13 
1. Active Shooting Duration ............................................................14 
2. Number and Gender of Active Shooters ....................................15 
3. Active Shooting Locations ...........................................................15 
4. Active Shooter Probability of Kill ..............................................16 
5. Typical Firearms Used ................................................................16 
6. Resolution .....................................................................................17 
B. AGENT-BASED MODELS OF ACTIVE SHOOTINGS ....................18 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE ACTIVE SHOOTING 
RESPONSES ............................................................................................22 
IV. METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................................25 
A. MODEL PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS ................................25 
1. Model Layout ...............................................................................25 
2. Active Shooter Entrance Locations and Routes of Travel .......26 
3. JASPR Component Locations ....................................................28 
4. Simulation Duration and Time Step ..........................................28 
5. Active Shooter Assumptions .......................................................29 
6. Bystander Assumptions ...............................................................29 
7. First Responder Assumptions .....................................................30 
viii 
8. Agent Movement Rates................................................................30 
B. EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES...........................................................30 
1. Independent Variables.................................................................30 
2. Conditional Variables and Response of Interest .......................34 
C. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS ...............................................................36 
D. MODELING AND ANALYSIS SOFTWARE ......................................38 
1. ABM Software—Pythagoras.......................................................38 
2. Analytical Software—JMP .........................................................38 
E. VARIABILITY FOR A REPRESENTATIVE “BASE” CASE ..........39 
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ..............................................................................41 
A. EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS ...................................................41 
B. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF TOTAL DEATHS .............................42 
C. BIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF TOTAL DEATHS VERSUS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ..............................................................43 
1. Total Deaths versus Active Shooter Entrance Location ...........44 
2. Total Deaths versus Active Shooter Suicide ..............................45 
3. Total Deaths versus JASPR Presence ........................................47 
4. Mean Total Deaths versus Active Shooter p(Hit) .....................48 
5. Mean Total Deaths versus First Responder Response 
Time ...............................................................................................49 
D. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF TOTAL DEATHS VERSUS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ..............................................................50 
1. Estimating Mean Total Deaths with Stepwise Regression .......50 
2. Estimating Mean Total Deaths with a Partition Tree ..............55 
3. Random Forest Analysis .............................................................58 
4. Total Deaths versus Categorical Variables (Active 
Shooter Entrance, JASPR Presence, Active Shooter 
Suicide) ..........................................................................................59 
VI. DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................61 
A. JASPR EFFECTIVENESS .....................................................................61 
1. Circumstances where JASPR Was Least Effective ..................61 
2. Circumstances where JASPR Was Most Effective ...................62 
B. LIMITATIONS ........................................................................................63 
1. External Validity ..........................................................................63 
2. JASPR Assumptions ....................................................................64 
3. Casualties versus Fatalities .........................................................64 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................................................64 
1. Expanding Physical Layout of Model ........................................64 
ix 
2. Additional Variables ....................................................................65 
3. Scope of Current Variables .........................................................65 
4. Cost Estimation of JASPR ..........................................................65 
VII. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................67 
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................69 
A. EMERGENCY ALARM RESPONSE TIMES AT WEST 
POINT, NY ...............................................................................................69 
B. FIRST RESPONDER RESPONSE TIMES TO ACTIVE 
SHOOTER EVENTS ...............................................................................70 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................71 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Mean Values by COA (for the Initial JASPR Research Results). 
Source: McDonald (2019)............................................................................6 
Figure 2. Alert Beacon Example. Source: Alertus Technologies (n.d.). .....................8 
Figure 3. Emergency Duress Button Example.  Source: Alertus Technologies 
(n.d.). ............................................................................................................8 
Figure 4. LED Marquee Example. Source: Alertus Technologies (n.d.). ...................9 
Figure 5. Wall-Mounted Light and Horn Example. Source: Alertus 
Technologies (n.d.). .....................................................................................9 
Figure 6. Gunshot Detector Example. Source: Louroe Electronics (n.d.). ................10 
Figure 7. Squad Tracking System Example. Source: TRX Systems (n.d.). ..............11 
Figure 8. An Increasing Trend in Active Shooter Incidents and Casualties in 
the United States between 2000–2018. Source: Blair and Schweit 
(2014). ........................................................................................................14 
Figure 9. A Study of 160 Active Shooter Incidents in the United States 
between 2000–2013: Location Categories.  Source: Blair and 
Schweit (2014). ..........................................................................................15 
Figure 10. Most Powerful Weapon Used. Source: Blair et al. (2014). .......................16 
Figure 11. Active Shooter Event Resolution. Source: Blair et al. (2014). ..................17 
Figure 12. Consolidated Results on Casualties. Source: Anklam et al. (2015). ..........18 
Figure 13. Main Effects Plot for Indoor Scenario. Source: Hayes and Hayes 
(2014). ........................................................................................................19 
Figure 14. Casualties by Simulation End Time in Control and Experimental 
Conditions. Source: Briggs and Kennedy (2016). .....................................20 
Figure 15. Casualties by Delay During an Active Shooting. Source: Lee et al. 
(2018). ........................................................................................................22 
Figure 16. USMAPS Second Floor—Main Sections ..................................................25 
Figure 17. Active Shooter Entrance and Route of Travel for Classrooms ..................26 
xii 
Figure 18. Active Shooter Entrance and Route of Travel for Cafeteria ......................27 
Figure 19. Active Shooter Entrance and Route of Travel for Dorm Rooms ...............28 
Figure 20. USMAPS Second Floor—JASPR Component Locations .........................28 
Figure 21. Scatterplot Matrix for Numeric Independent Variables .............................37 
Figure 22. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables. ...........................................38 
Figure 23. Total Deaths Inflicted by Active Shooter: No JASPR, Dorm Room 
Entrance, No Suicide, 20-Minute Response Time .....................................39 
Figure 24. Scatterplot Matrix of Independent and Conditional Variables ..................41 
Figure 25. Total Deaths Across all Independent Variables .........................................43 
Figure 26. Total Deaths by Active Shooter Entrance Location  (Classrooms, 
Cafeteria, Dorm Rooms) ............................................................................45 
Figure 27. Total Deaths by Active Shooter Suicide ....................................................46 
Figure 28. Total Deaths by JASPR Presence (Yes or No) ..........................................47 
Figure 29. Mean Total Deaths versus Active Shooter p(Hit) ......................................48 
Figure 30. Mean Total Deaths versus First Responder Response Time .....................49 
Figure 31. Actual versus Predicted Square Root of Mean Total Deaths .....................51 
Figure 32. Residual Plot for Square Root of Mean Total Death Regression ..............51 
Figure 33. QQ-Plot for √(Mean Total Deaths) ............................................................52 
Figure 34. JMP Prediction Profile for the Regression on Mean Total Deaths ............54 
Figure 35. Interactions between Independent Variables .............................................55 
Figure 36. Partition Tree for Mean Total Deaths ........................................................56 
Figure 37. Partition Tree Split History by R2 ..............................................................57 
Figure 38. Total Deaths versus the Three Categorical Variables. ...............................59 
Figure 39. Histogram of Actual First Responder Response Times  for West 
Point MPs ...................................................................................................69 
Figure 40. Police Response Time. Source: Blair et al. (2014). ...................................70 
xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Table of Independent Variables within the ABM ......................................34 
Table 2. Table of Conditional Variables within the ABM .......................................36 
Table 3. Base Case Quantiles ...................................................................................40 
Table 4. Base Case Summary Statistics ...................................................................40 
Table 5. Stepwise Regression—Summary of Fit Statistics......................................52 
Table 6. Stepwise Regression—Parameter Estimates (Sorted) ...............................53 
Table 7. Decision Tree—Metrics on Five Splits. .....................................................56 
Table 8. Total Deaths Variance Explained ..............................................................58 
Table 9. Suggested Beta Distribution Parameters ....................................................70 
 
xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ABM  agent-based model 
AS active shooter 
CCW  concealed-carry weapon 
DoD Department of Defense 
DOE  design of experiments 
DP  design point 
IQR interquartile range 
JASPR  Joint Active Shooter Protection and Response 
NPS  Naval Postgraduate School 





















Active shootings in the United States have steadily increased since at least 2000, as 
has the number of casualties resulting from these events (Blair & Schweit, 2014). The DoD 
has also experienced its share of active shootings and casualties, most notably in 
connection with the Fort Hood shooting by Nidal Hassan in November 2009 that resulted 
in 45 casualties, the Navy Yard shooting in September 2013 that resulted in 20 casualties, 
and a second Fort Hood shooting by Ivan Lopez in April of 2014 that resulted in 15 
casualties. A host of other active shootings over the years resulted in further casualties 
(Blair & Schweit, 2014). There is little evidence suggesting that the number of active 
shootings and their attendant casualties will cease.  
This research looks at a DoD system titled “Joint Active Shooter Protection and 
Response (JASPR).” JASPR is designed to detect an active shooting with a gunshot 
detector; notify bystanders in the vicinity of the active shooting with local alert sirens, 
signs, and emergency alarms; alert local first responders to the active shooting; and then 
safeguard bystanders and impede the movement of the active shooter with active door locks 
once the shooting commences. Earlier research at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
called for such a system to reduce active shooting casualties by allowing bystanders to react 
faster and reduce the time required to summon first responders (Ergenbright & Hubbard, 
2012). However, there is little-to-no published research on how effective such a system 
might actually be in practice. This research expands on unpublished work (McDonald, 
2019) previously conducted at the NPS Simulation Experiments & Efficient Designs 
(SEED) Center for Data Farming, by estimating how effective JASPR is under a simulated 
agent-based model (ABM). 
Agent-based models capture how multiple different simulated autonomous entities 
(“agents”) in a virtual environment react over time to simulated events and other agents 
(Macal & North, 2010). The model in this study specifically captures agent behavior 
between an active shooter agent and bystander agents across a hypothetical location based 
on the second floor of the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School at West Point, NY 
(see Figure 1). The active shooter enters the second floor at one of three locations, opening 
xviii 
fire at bystanders in either the dorm rooms, cafeteria, or classrooms section of the building, 
and continuing to fire while moving across the building according to a predefined set of 
waypoints. Bystanders in the building then flee to the nearest exits or attempt to hide or 
take cover in the rooms or classrooms to avoid the shooter.  
 
Diagram shows the different sections of building (top), and locations of JASPR components in 
building (bottom). 
Figure 1. Second Floor of USMAPS Building at West Point, NY 
The model simulates 45,000 active shooter incidents while systematically varying 
active shooter entrance, JASPR presence, active shooter decision to suicide, time until first 
responder response to the event, active shooter probability of hitting the intended target, 
active shooter rate of fire, and the number of bystanders at each of the building sections 
(classrooms, cafeteria, dorm rooms). All variables are examined systematically using an 
experimental design to reduce variable collinearity. The results of these active shooter 
xix 
incidents are collectively analyzed to determine how effective JASPR, along with each of 
the other variables, is at reducing Total Deaths. 
Figure 2 shows a set of boxplots capturing Total Deaths at the end of each active 
shooter incident if a JASPR system is not present (left set of six boxplots), compared to 
bystander deaths if a JASPR system is present (right set of six boxplots). The boxplots are 
also color coded by shooter entrance location (green for cafeteria, blue for classroom, 
purple for dorm rooms), and are further separated by whether or not the active shooter 
suicided. 
 
Figure 2. Total Deaths versus Three Categorical Variables 
xx 
Figure 2 reveals several key insights regarding the JASPR system and its 
effectiveness at reducing Total Deaths, the effect of the active shooter’s choice of entry 
location into the building, and the degree of effect the shooter’s suicide has on Total 
Deaths. Key findings include the following: 
• Total deaths are dramatically lower when the JASPR system is present, and 
other analyses of the model’s results confirm this. Moreover, the model 
suggests that JASPR’s presence is the single most critical factor for 
reducing Total Deaths. This effect is seen by comparing the left half of 
Figure 2 (Total Deaths without JASPR Presence) against the right half of 
Figure 2 (Total Deaths with JASPR Presence).  
• The active shooter’s choice of entry location matters significantly, as the 
contrasting results in Total Deaths indicates. JASPR is most effective at 
reducing Total Deaths when the active shooter begins firing at bystanders 
located inside their dorm rooms. The dorm rooms are isolated and present a 
small but relatively continuous set of targets for the active shooter to 
engage. Bystanders targeted by the active shooter in these scenarios are 
typically unable to alert first responders or the rest of the building before 
dying, which leads to a comparatively larger numbers of deaths. When 
JASPR is activated however, doors are locked and the active shooter’s 
access to more targets is blocked. 
• The difference JASPR makes in Total Deaths for the cafeteria scenario and 
classroom entrance scenario is smaller compared to the dorm room entrance 
scenario. In the cafeteria entrance scenario, many targets are presented to 
the shooter simultaneously. This set of targets has a collectively higher 
chance of avoiding the shooter, alerting the rest of the building, and 




• The classrooms entrance scenario shows a middle ground for Total Deaths 
between the cafeteria and classroom entrance scenario. The classroom 
section has larger rooms and a greater population density compared to the 
dorm rooms. Conversely, the classroom section has more rooms and is 
typically less densely populated than the cafeteria. 
Although the results presented in this study are limited to the model they are based 
on, JASPR’s potential in this study suggests more research into a set of active shooter 
defeat mechanisms is warranted. Ultimately, such research may reduce the scale of such 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At approximately 4:15 pm on April second, 2014, Army Specialist Ivan A. Lopez 
shot his Smith & Wesson .45 pistol at 15 Soldiers across five separate locations, wounding 
12 and killing three. Shortly after he opened fire, Lopez was narrowly prevented from 
entering a nearby conference room at his unit’s headquarters office building and taking 
more lives when another Army Sergeant First Class physically barricaded the door (Tan, 
2015). Lopez committed suicide after he was confronted by Military Police (MPs) at 
approximately 4:25 pm, just 10 minutes after he began shooting.  
This was not the first instance of what people now term an “Active Shooting” at 
Fort Hood. On November 5, 2009, just a few years earlier, MAJ Nidal Hasan fired a pistol 
to kill 13 (plus an unborn child) and injure at least 30 other people at Fort Hood’s Soldier 
Readiness Center (SRC) (McFadden, 2009). Civilian police shot MAJ Hasan multiple 
times as he pursued a wounded victim who had begun moving away from the SRC; we can 
only speculate whether MAJ Hasan would have continued his rampage.  
Active shootings and their concomitant losses of life are certainly not unique to 
Soldiers on Fort Hood, TX, or to the U.S. military. In a formal study jointly sponsored by 
the FBI and Texas State University, more than 160 active shootings in the United States 
are noted between 2000 and 2013 (Blair & Schweit, 2014). The study included the 
Washington Navy Yard shooting on September 16, 2013, with 12 deaths and an additional 
seven injured; a U.S. Army recruiting center shooting on June 1, 2009, with one death and 
one injury; and a shooting at the Pentagon on March 4, 2010, with no deaths and two 
injuries. Further shootings in the report include such infamous names as the Columbine 
High School shooting (13 deaths, 21 wounded) on April 20, 1999; the Virginia Tech 
shooting (32 deaths, 17 wounded) on April 16, 2007; the Sandy Hook Elementary School 
shooting (28 deaths, two wounded) on December 14, 2012; the Aurora, CO, movie theater 
shooting (12 deaths, 70 wounded) on July 20, 2012; and, of course, multiple other active 
shootings over the years to the present. In response, a host of proposed solutions to active 
shootings over the decades have sought to blame or fix a range of issues in order to address 
the problem: the mental health of possible shooters, universal background checks for gun 
2 
purchasers, increased security at possible events and locations, increasing or decreasing the 
availability of firearms to the general population, training and arming teachers to react to 
an event, active shooter reaction drills, electronic mass warning systems, and others. This 
research is intended to examine a more immediate solution to an active shooting. 
A. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
A comparatively small amount of research has been conducted over the years on 
more technologically sophisticated means to detect an active shooting in progress, alert 
first responders and bystanders, and ultimately reduce the number of casualties, or potential 
casualties, from an active shooting. Research by Ergenbright and Hubbard in 2012 spurred 
proposals to the Department of Defense (DoD) for a network of active shooter defeat 
mechanisms. Though Ergenbright and Hubbard originally titled such a system a “Victim 
Initiated Mitigation System,” the system fielded by the DoD is now termed the “Joint 
Active Shooter Protection and Response” (JASPR) system, or simply “JASPR” 
(Ergenbright & Hubbard, 2012). JASPR is designed to detect an active shooter, alert local 
first responders and bystanders in the vicinity to the presence of an active shooter, 
potentially isolate the shooter, and ultimately reduce the number of casualties during an 
active shooting. JASPR’s components, discussed with more detail in the next chapter, 
interact to reduce the threat posed by an active shooter.  
JASPR’s success at reducing overall casualties may be more or less effective 
depending on a number of other factors. Factors that may affect JASPR’s success might 
include where the active shooter begins firing, how many people are in the vicinity of the 
active shooting, the duration of the active shooting, how rapidly the shooter fires, how 
accurate the shooter is, whether the shooter commits suicide, and a host of other possible 
factors. Just one early study into the effectiveness of JASPR has taken place (McDonald, 
2019). McDonald’s study used Pythagoras, a government owned agent-based modeling 
(ABM) program, to simulate an active shooter event. The Literature Review of this thesis 
discusses McDonald’s previous research. However, further research is necessary to 
understand whether a JASPR presence at an active shooting, or some other factor or 
3 
combination of factors, may contribute most to an overall reduction in active shooting 
casualties and reduce the potential loss of life in these scenarios. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How effective is JASPR at reducing the total number of deaths in an active 
shooting, given the many possible factors that might influence this? The analysis provided 
in this thesis may assist in quantifying JASPR’s effectiveness under various conditions, 
illuminating where the greatest potential exists to reduce the duration of an active shooting, 
thus resulting in fewer lives lost and reduced costs to the DoD in terms of property damage 
and lost operational tempo. 
C. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The Background section provides an in-depth description of the JASPR system, 
including its proposed components, their purpose, and a small discussion of how  
JASPR was developed. Previous research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) Simulation Experiments & Efficient Designs (SEED) Center in Monterey, CA,  
is highlighted. 
The Literature Review for this thesis focuses on the characteristics of an active 
shooting, including a review of what the “typical” active shooter in the United States looks 
like, frequent locations for active shootings, weapon types used in active shootings, the 
effectiveness of first responders to the shootings, and the frequencies and severity of active 
shootings. The insights summarized within this section are used to identify critical 
variables worth examining via a designed experiment. Additionally, other attempts to 
simulate active shootings using an ABM and their main conclusions are reviewed. 
The Methodology chapter covers the model and design of the experiment. Context 
for the ABM is provided, and the independent variables, identified from the Literature 
Review chapter, as well as the conditional variables and main response, are discussed. An 
explanation of the design of experiments employed to obtain the data generated by the 
ABM and the main analytical techniques to evaluate the data is provided. 
4 
The Results and Analysis chapter describes the data that resulted from the designed 
experiment ABM and what the implications are for effective deployment of JASPR. The 
main response variable, Total Deaths, the effects of each of the independent variables on 
Total Deaths, and the analytical techniques indicated in the Methodology chapter are 
conducted on the data. 
The Discussion chapter identifies the critical findings from the Results and Analysis 
chapter to answer the research question. Additional insights gained from the analysis are 
also described.  
The Conclusion provides a synthesis of the main insights into how effective JASPR 
is at reducing the number of deaths from an active shooting under various circumstances, 
and suggests where and under what circumstances JASPR would likely be most effective. 
5 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. PREVIOUS RESEARCH INTO JASPR 
Mary McDonald of the NPS SEED Center conducted the initial, but unpublished, 
experimental research into JASPR in late 2019. Her efforts included the creation of an 
ABM (similar to the one used in this thesis) to simulate an active shooting at the USMAPS 
building at West Point, NY, to understand which of multiple JASPR components are the 
most effective in disrupting an active shooter’s rampage.  
McDonald’s research examined five cases, known colloquially in the military as 
courses of action (COAs), for JASPR effectiveness at the dormitory section of the 
USMAPS building (2019). The characteristics of these five cases differ in the availability 
of “layers” of individual JASPR components. Case 1 uses no JASPR components. Case 2 
uses alert beacons coupled with a text-to-speech (TTS) feature, LED marquees, emergency 
duress buttons, and gunshot detectors. Case 3 includes all of the JASPR components from 
Case 2, but adds networked cameras and incorporates access controls to the building’s 
doors. Case 4 includes all of the JASPR components from Case 3, but adds a squad tracking 
system (these types of systems are often abbreviated as a “Blue Force Tracking” (BFT) 
system within the military) with chat features and floor plan for the first responders to the 
active shooting. Case 5 includes all of the Case 4 JASPR components, but is divided into 
two separate ‘sub-cases;’ the first sub-case (called “5a”) eliminates the gun shot detectors 
from Case 4, and the second sub-case (called “5b”) includes the gun shot detectors, but 
eliminates the emergency duress buttons from Case 4. These particular cases were 
requested by the JASPR office, for whom the study was conducted. Figure 1, taken from a 
briefing to the JASPR office, contains the mean values for the JASPR system’s trigger 
time, first responder notification time, first responder response time, time the active shooter 
was killed, and the number of victims shot.  
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Figure 1. Mean Values by COA (for the Initial JASPR Research Results). 
Source: McDonald (2019). 
McDonald’s research not only suggests that JASPR might be effective at reducing 
the number of victims shot by an active shooter, but also suggests that different layers of 
JASPR components may be more, or less, effective at reducing the number of victims shot 
and reducing the response time to the scene of an active shooting. These results also 
suggested that the initial “base” layer of beacons, visual displays, gunshot detectors, and 
panic buttons (COA 2) provided the largest reduction in first responders notification time, 
though the additional layer containing cameras and access control via automatic door locks 
(COA 3) provided the greatest reduction in victims shot.  
This thesis expands on this earlier research. While the same base ABM is used, 
additional variables are explored, including additional entrance options (class-room and 
cafeteria entrance) for the active shooter, the possibility of the active shooter committing 
suicide, a “cognitive delay” (explained more fully in the Literature Review) for bystanders, 
and variations on the location and total number of bystanders within the model.  
Finally, for the simulation runs conducted, the JASPR system presence is treated as a 
binary option (all or nothing), and not treated as layers of components as is the case in 
previous research. 
B. JASPR COMPONENTS 
JASPR in its proposed form relies on several components: alert beacons with text-
to-speech capability, emergency duress buttons, LED marquees, warning lights in a variety 



















COA 1  No JASPR 0 7.5 12.9 17.6 40.6
COA 2  Beacons/Marquis/ TTS/PanicButtons/GSD 1.8 1.8 7.1 13.6 28.9
COA 3  Add Cameras and Access Control 1.9 1.9 7.1 11.7 4.1
COA 4  Add BFT, chat, bldg floor plan 1.8 1.8 7.1 11.3 3.1
COA 5a  WITH Panic Buttons, NO GSD 2.5 2.5 7.8 12.3 5.9
COA 5b  WITH GSD, NO Panic Buttons 2.3 2.3 7.6 12.1 3.6
7 
door locks. Ideally, JASPR is the integrated functioning of each of these components, 
where the total system allows potential victims in the vicinity of a developing active 
shooting to signal the event and/or locates an active shooting by the sound of gunshots, 
alerts nearby bystanders of an in-progress active shooting with spoken warnings and visual 
cues, alerts first responders of the same shooting, automatically locks doors to prevent 
active shooter entrance, and allows first responders to closely coordinate their tactical 
approach as they move to respond to the shooting (or shooter). Examples of several 
proposed components for JASPR are provided by Alertus Technologies, Louroe 
Electronics, and TRX Systems, commercial security vendors that sell security technology. 
These vendors are listed here because the JASPR system proponent relied directly on these 
vendors to produce their version of a JASPR system. Pictures of the relevant sub-systems 
and components are provided with a short description of each technology. However, in the 
work the emphasis is on the capability that the technology provides, not the vendor selling 
the technology.  
1. Alert Beacons 
Alert beacons are described as “wall-mounted integrated audible visual notification 
appliance [s] with ultimate reliability” (Alertus Technologies, n.d.). The alert beacons are 
designed to flash or strobe when triggered, as well as to display messages sent to them. In 
an active shooting, the alert beacons will notify personnel and bystanders in the vicinity 
that (1) an emergency is taking place, (2) it is an active shooting, and (3) further details of 
the shooting and potential instructions will be given as available. An example alert beacon 
is shown in Figure 2.  
Additionally, a text-to-speech option allows nearby personnel to hear a message 
corresponding to the written message displayed on the beacon’s face. The additional 




Figure 2. Alert Beacon Example. Source: Alertus Technologies (n.d.). 
2. Emergency Duress Buttons 
Emergency duress buttons, also known as “Panic Buttons,” in JASPR are described 
as an “[i]mmediate, easy, single-point activation for emergency notification” (Alertus 
Technologies, n.d.). These buttons allow bystanders to respond immediately to an active 
shooting if an emergency duress button is nearby and the bystanders are physically capable 
of reaching the button. An example emergency duress button is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Emergency Duress Button Example.  
Source: Alertus Technologies (n.d.). 
3. LED Marquees 
The LED marquees are proposed as a method to “cost-effectively reach large indoor 
or outdoor public areas with emergency notifications” (Alertus Technologies, n.d.). The 
main function of the LED marquee is to provide written notification in the same way that 
an alert beacon would, but to provide the message in larger font in much larger spaces  
(e.g., lobbies, large seating areas). Presumably, the marquee’s visual reach in larger spaces 
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would assist in crowd notification, encouraging bystanders to evacuate the building and 
avoid becoming victims when an active shooter is in the building. An example LED 
marquee is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. LED Marquee Example. Source: Alertus Technologies (n.d.). 
4. Standalone Light and Sound Signals 
Wall-mounted light and sound signals are another proposed technology within the 
JASPR system. Light signals provide a visual system to warn or caution local bystanders 
that an emergency is in progress. One problem cited by Stewart (2017) is the delay before 
bystanders realize an active shooting is occurring in their vicinity. A standalone light 
system flashing warning lights or emergency system sounds to a crowd may allow 
bystanders to react more quickly at a safer distance than the alert beacons or LED 
marquees, particularly for those in rooms out of sight range, but not necessarily outside of 
audible warning range. An example wall-mounted light and horn is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Wall-Mounted Light and Horn Example. 
Source: Alertus Technologies (n.d.). 
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5. Gunshot Detection System 
Gunshot detectors use an embedded microphone to listen for gunshot sounds and 
alert first responders. One commercial vendor, Louroe Electronics, describes their system 
as recognizing “firearm discharge in various firearms in different settings. Within seconds 
of a gunshot, the software accurately classifies and triggers an immediate notification 
through VMS [video management systems]” (Louroe Electronics, n.d.). Security staff can 
then verify and reduce the reaction time of security personnel. The same vendor suggests 
the system has a detection range of 245 feet in a quiet environment, 100 feet in a normal 
environment, and 75 feet in a noisy environment, and it can be configured for “omni-
directional, bidirectional, or directional” (Louroe Electronics, n.d.) sound. An example 
gunshot detector is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Gunshot Detector Example. Source: Louroe Electronics (n.d.). 
6. Squad Tracking System 
A squad tracking system ideally links first response teams and enables them to 
coordinate an improved tactical approach in real-time to a building or site after an active 
shooting commences. Squad tracking technology should allow a team to enter a building 
at the appropriate location(s), block egresses for an identified active shooter, and allow first 
responders to notify each other when an active shooter has been apprehended or killed.  
At least one proposed vendor, TRX Systems, sells a system that allows continued operation 
of the system in Global Positioning Systems (GPS) denial situations, such as buildings  




Figure 7. Squad Tracking System Example. Source: TRX Systems (n.d.). 
7. Automatic Door Locking System 
Automatic door locks integrated into JASPR will electronically lock on notification 
of an active shooting. The door locks will either prevent an active shooter from entering 
into a room or might require them to spend extra time destroying or disabling the lock, 
allowing bystanders additional time to escape and first responders to arrive. Automatic 
door locks, as they are currently proposed in JASPR, will also allow door egress; the 
automatic door locks, if they function as intended, will assist personnel fleeing or hiding 
from a shooter, but would retard shooter progress through a structure.  
Automatic door locks are a possible ethical problem. Engaging door locks while 
bystanders are locked inside a room in close proximity to the active shooter would likely 
increase their probability of being victimized. Modeling this particular system may indeed 
show a reduction in overall lives lost during an active shooting, but at the cost of several 
bystander lives at the start of the shooting. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is focused on describing and evaluating (1) the typical 
characteristics of an active shooting, (2) agent-based models of active shootings, and 
(3) previous recommendations made to thwart active shootings. 
A. TYPICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTING 
One of the more in-depth and authoritative sources for defining a typical active 
shooting comes from the FBI and Texas State University’s study where they reviewed 
160 active shootings occurring between 2000 and 2013 (Blair & Schweit, 2014). Blair and 
Schweit adopt the FBI’s definition of an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged 
in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area” (FBI, n.d.a.), and further state 
that “implicit in this definition is that the subject’s criminal actions involve the use of 
firearms” (Blair & Schweit, 2014). Part of this study is dedicated toward documenting the 
increasing trend in active shootings, where Blair and Schweit illustrated a clear increase in 
the number of active shootings over these years. It is worth noting the comparative increase 
in the number of bystanders killed over the same time period as well. The study observed 
“an average of 6.4 incidents occurred annually” (p. 8), but that “In the last seven years of 
the study, that average increased to 16.4 incidents annually” (p. 8). The FBI hosts updates 
to the 2013 report annually to show the most recent statistics on active shootings. Figure 8 
shows the most recent update of their infographic indicating the number of shootings and 
total casualties over the years (Blair & Schweit, 2014). Visual inspection of Figure 8 
suggests the increasing overall trend in frequency of active shootings and number of 
associated casualties. 
Figure 8. An Increasing Trend in Active Shooter Incidents and 
Casualties in the United States between 2000–2018. 
Source: FBI (n.d.b.). 
In the study, several characteristics of active shootings are noted, including an 
increasing trend in shootings, typical shooting duration, number of shooters, and shooting 
locations (Blair & Schweit, 2014). 
1. Active Shooting Duration
On review of a subset of cases where the duration of shootings was available, the 
2014 Blair and Schweit study observed that most shootings are finished within several 
minutes: “In 63 incidents where the duration of the incident could be ascertained, 
44 (69.8%) of 63 incidents ended in 5 minutes or less, with 23 ending in 2 minutes or less” 
(p. 8). Moreover, they noted that the majority of incidents “ended on the shooter’s initiative 
before the police arrived—sometimes when the shooter committed suicide or stopped 
shooting, and other times when the shooter fled the scene” (p. 11). 
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2. Number and Gender of Active Shooters 
The Blair and Schweit study observed that in just two of the 160 cases reviewed 
there are two shooters (2014). The remaining 158 cases are restricted to a single shooter. 
Additionally, of the total number of shooters, just six are female. 
3. Active Shooting Locations 
A plurality of the 160 active shootings identified by Blair and Schweit occurred at 
commercial locations (73), followed by educational institutions (39), and government 
(including military) properties (16) (2014). Blair and Schweit show that the remaining 
active shootings occurred in open spaces (15), residences (7), houses of worship (6), and 
healthcare facilities (4). Of the 16 government shootings cited, five of these occurred on 
military property. Figure 9 displays a pie chart indicating these active shooting locations 
by percentage. 
 
Figure 9. A Study of 160 Active Shooter Incidents in the United States 
between 2000–2013: Location Categories.  
Source: Blair and Schweit (2014). 
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4. Active Shooter Probability of Kill 
Of the 160 active shootings between 2000 and 2013, Blair and Schweit show that 
there are 1,043 casualties (not including the active shooter) (2014). Of these casualties, 
486 are fatalities, while the remaining 557 are wounded. This suggests a probability of 
0.47 kills per bystander hit, or p(Kill|Hit) = 0.47.  
5. Typical Firearms Used 
A majority of active shooters used nothing more powerful than a pistol, a minority 
used a rifle, and a smaller minority used a shotgun, per Blair et al. (2014). Blair et al. 
provide a convenient infographic, shown in Figure 10, to indicate the most powerful 
weapon used in 104 different active shootings. 
 
Figure 10. Most Powerful Weapon Used. Source: Blair et al. (2014). 
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6. Resolution 
Blair et al. (2014) indicated that, in 51 active shootings out of 104 studied, the event 
concluded before the police arrived, with the attacker stopping by suicide or leaving of his 
own accord 34 times out of 51 and the remaining 17 times the shooter is stopped by the 
bystanders either shooting or subduing him. After police arrivals, the shooter is stopped by 
a police shooting or subduing him in 32 times of 53, and conversely, the shooter suicides 
or surrenders in the remaining 21 times without direct police action. Figure 11 summarizes 
how active shootings in Blair et al.’s study are resolved with a flowchart of outcomes. 
 
Figure 11. Active Shooter Event Resolution. Source: Blair et al. (2014). 
In a significant number of events depicted by this flowchart, the active shooter 
suicides (44/104), and the majority of the suicides (29/44) occur before police arrival. 
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B. AGENT-BASED MODELS OF ACTIVE SHOOTINGS 
Anklam et al. (2015) modeled a scenario showing civilian casualties over time after 
an active shooter enters a hypothetical school building, randomly selects either one of three 
classrooms, an office, or the school cafeteria, “shoots victims in 20-second intervals for 
two to five minutes before leaving and choosing another destination” (p. 10). The active 
shooter then moves to the next randomly selected location within the school until stopped. 
Anklam et al. varied whether 0%, 5%, or 10% of teachers or school staff carried a 
concealed-carry weapon (CCW), in this case a firearm, in order to rapidly respond to an 
active shooter incident, and whether the school retained an armed first responder on site to 
handle an active shooter incident. The authors show a decrease in casualties when either 
an armed first responder is on scene and able to confront the active shooter or a member of 
the school staff is able to confront the active shooter with their CCW. Figure 12 is a 
consolidated set of results, showing the higher number of casualties attributed to the lack 
of on scene bystanders with access to CCWs. 
 
Figure 12. Consolidated Results on Casualties. Source: Anklam et al. (2015). 
Hayes and Hayes (2014) created an ABM to understand how a proposed 2013 bill 
from the U.S. Senate might mitigate the number of civilians killed or wounded. Using a 
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few rules for the active shooter, civilian, and security guard agents, they modeled casualty 
rates from both an indoor and an outdoor active shooting based on a set of parameters for 
(1) running speed, (2) number of bullets fired per second, (3) aiming deviation (for both 
gunman and security guards), (4) magazine capacity for the shooters, (5) gun range, and 
(6) “escape distance” (para. 3.7). Perhaps just as critically, Hayes and Hayes made a serious 
attempt to validate their model by successfully comparing their results against the data 
obtained from the Aurora, CO mass shooting by James Holmes (para. 3.17). Their model 
produced results indicating a linear, or nearly linear relationship between casualties and 
rate of fire, reproduced in Figure 13, though one of their most insightful discoveries may 
have been that the presence of one or more first responders (security guards) seems to 
dramatically reduce the number of people shot.  
 
Figure 13. Main Effects Plot for Indoor Scenario. Source: Hayes and Hayes (2014). 
Briggs and Kennedy (2016) modeled an active shooting scenario to address the 
effectiveness of bystanders choosing to fight against an active shooter. One of their most 
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significant observations was to suggest that actively opposing a shooter (a “fight” response) 
tends to delay the shooter, and although it typically caused the fighters to become victims, 
even a small unarmed but coordinated group can dramatically reduce casualty rates in such 
events. They also note that their results support the conclusions drawn by Hayes and Hayes, 
stating “[t]he number of casualties sustained in each incident is directly related to time 
since the shooter has a sustained rate of fire of one round per second” (p. 3526), implying 
a relationship between casualties and the active shooting duration. Their results, 
graphically displayed in Figure 14, also strongly hint at a rapid increase in the number of 
casualties at the beginning of a mass shooting, followed by a peak and then a leveling-off 
of casualties, regardless of whether the shooter was subdued or not (though the subdued 
shooters failed to produce as many casualties).  
 
Plot displays a random sample of 500 of 2000 models runs for ease  
of visibility. 
Figure 14. Casualties by Simulation End Time in Control and Experimental 
Conditions. Source: Briggs and Kennedy (2016). 
21 
Stewart (2017) provides another agent-based model that evaluated civilian 
casualties by: “law enforcement response times,” “civilian response strategy [run, hide, or 
a combination of run and hide],” and the “cognitive delay” (time until event recognition) 
for the civilians involved in the incident. Stewart observed that quicker response times by 
law enforcement, a mix of running and hiding by civilians rather than adherence to one 
strategy, and reduced cognitive delays by civilians all tended to decrease casualty rates. 
Stewart concluded that mandatory active shooter training is most effective in reducing 
civilian casualties, followed by security guard intervention. 
Finally, Lee et al. (2018) created an agent-based model to observe both civilian and 
first responder casualties in a scenario intended to reflect a large outdoor public event with 
up to 500 civilians in a 500-foot by 300-foot area, a physically isolated active shooter, and 
a police presence nearby, loosely reflecting the 2017 Las Vegas-style active shooting. They 
carried out their study, altering the four independent variables one-at-a-time: evacuation 
delay times (0–120 seconds), which loosely reflect a cognitive delay by the bystanders 
in their scenario, police response times (0–30 seconds), active shooter firing rates  
(1–60 seconds), and first responder firing rates (1–60 seconds). Lee et al. demonstrated a 
clear increase in civilian casualties with an increase in the active shooter’s firing rate, 
evacuation delay, and first responder delay. They also observed a decrease in civilian 
casualties with an increase in first responder firing rate. While they do not explicitly state 
this, their results suggest that most civilian casualties occur as a result of the active shooter 
firing rate, but the fewest casualties as a result of the cognitive delay. Figure 15 shows Lee 
et al.’s casualty rates against the length of evacuation delay. 
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Figure 15. Casualties by Delay During an Active Shooting. 
Source: Lee et al. (2018). 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE ACTIVE SHOOTING 
RESPONSES 
Ergenbright and Hubbard (2012) examined 14 case studies of active shootings in 
the United States, one active shooting in Norway (Utoya Island), and the Oslo bombing. 
They note that the average active shooter event lasts roughly 12.5 minutes, while the 
average law enforcement response time to these incidents is 18 minutes. They also studied 
the corresponding active shooter’s rates of kill in each case study and proposed three 
hypotheses after examining these case studies: (1) that the “Prevention/preemption of the 
active shooter alone is insufficient to reduce the rate of kill,” (2) that “Law enforcement 
interdiction of the active shooter is insufficient to reduce the RK [rate of kill],” and, based 
on their first two hypotheses, that (3) “[a] victim initiated mitigation system will 
sufficiently synchronize immediate control measures with a prescribed set of automated 
and standardized responses in order to reduce the RK” (Ergenbright & Hubbard, 2012,  
pp. vii). They define a victim-initiated mitigation (VIM) as “A mechanism by which a 
victim or potential victim can initiate a combination of immediate mechanical lockdown 
responses accompanied with a standardized emergency response resulting in the 
containment and control of Target Areas and Threat Zones, as well as activation of a 
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standardized Emergency Action Plan,” (p. xxi) and argue that such a system is “the only 
effective means of reducing the effects of an Active Shooter” (p. 2). 
Whitney (2017) advocated for providing law enforcement and/or military tactics 
that “provide basic guidance in mindset, movement, and self-protection strategies that have 
the potential of improving the likelihood of survival of students, faculty, and staff alike” 
(p. vii). Although teaching military or law enforcement tactics to civilians may raise a 
substantial number of questions and issues, this line of thought complements the approach 








This chapter describes key operational details for the model, including its physical/
geographical location at the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS) at 
West Point, NY, the location of each JASPR component employed in the model, the active 
shooter’s probability of killing a bystander given a hit, agent movement rates, the active 
shooter’s ammunition load, and the active shooter’s firing range. This chapter also defines 
the independent and conditional variables used, the design of the experiment, and the 
software used for analysis. 
A. MODEL PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Model Layout 
The second floor of the USMAPS building at West Point, NY, provided the 
physical basis for the scenario in the ABM. The building provides multiple entrances and 
exits, two sets of stairwells, corridors, and differing room layouts, including dorm rooms, 
a cafeteria with kitchen, and several classrooms. Figure 16 illustrates the base map for the 
second floor of the USMAPS building and the different sections of the building, with the 
classrooms, cafeteria and kitchens, and dormitory rooms highlighted in blue, green, and 
purple, respectively. This color code is maintained throughout many of the graphics in the 
remainder of this thesis for easy comparison. Exits and entrances on the second floor are 
indicated in neon green.  
 
Figure 16. USMAPS Second Floor—Main Sections 
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2. Active Shooter Entrance Locations and Routes of Travel  
Three entrance locations for the active shooter, roughly corresponding with the 
classrooms, cafeteria and kitchen, and dormitory sections of the building, are designated 
within the second floor of the USMAPS building. One entrance for the active shooter 
would likely not provide as diverse a set of outcomes for the experiment, and three separate 
and diverse entrance locations are thought to be sufficient to test the effect of an active 
shooter in each of the different locations of the building. More than three entrance locations 
would likely not provide much additional insight for this scenario. The active shooter 
moves along a path through the building, determined by a set of pre-determined waypoints, 
with some randomness and some propensity to veer off the path to shoot at and move 
towards individual bystanders.  
a. Classroom Entrance 
In the classrooms entrance scenario, the active shooter proceeds roughly west to 
east, checking for potential targets in the multiple classrooms located along the west wing. 
After exiting the classrooms section of the building, the active shooter enters the cafeteria 
section of the building and finally proceeds through part of the kitchen area and then stops 
at the cafeteria entrance. Figure 17 corresponds roughly with the active shooter’s west 
wing/classrooms entrance and route of travel. 
 
Figure 17. Active Shooter Entrance and Route of Travel for Classrooms 
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b. Cafeteria Entrance 
In the cafeteria active shooter entrance scenario, the active shooter proceeds 
directly into the cafeteria, shooting as he moves roughly south, checks a back room within 
the kitchen, then proceeds west toward the classroom section of the building. This scenario 
is intended to show a “worst case” in which the active shooter opens fire into a crowded 
location. Figure 18 corresponds roughly with the active shooter’s designated cafeteria 
entrance and route of travel. 
 
Figure 18. Active Shooter Entrance and Route of Travel for Cafeteria 
c. Dorm Room Entrance 
In the dorm rooms entrance scenario, the active shooter enters the building at the 
east end of the dorm rooms section, then proceeds west along a narrow corridor, attempting 
to locate bystanders in each of the dormitory rooms. On exiting the dorm rooms section, 
the active shooter enters the kitchen, moves out to the cafeteria, exits the cafeteria, then 
enters the west wing with classrooms, and proceeds toward the western exit. Figure 19 
graphically shows the active shooter’s dormitory rooms entrance and route of travel 
through the building. 
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Figure 19. Active Shooter Entrance and Route of Travel for Dorm Rooms 
3. JASPR Component Locations 
The JASPR proponent determined suitable locations to place JASPR components, 
which included: beacons, cameras, gunshot detectors, marquees, and panic buttons. These 
locations are displayed with a symbol in legend Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. USMAPS Second Floor—JASPR Component Locations 
4. Simulation Duration and Time Step 
Each model run reflects a 30-minute time frame. This time frame is large enough 
to accommodate the 15-minute maximum for recorded First Responder Response Times to 
active shootings cited by Blair et al. (2014) and Blair and Schweit (2014).  
Model time steps occurred every other second. That is, the modeling software used 
for this study provided updates to agents and events every two seconds. 
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5. Active Shooter Assumptions 
a. Active Shooter Probability of Kill 
The model uses a p(kill|hit) = 0.47, given the research provided by Blair and 
Schweit (2014), and discussed in the Literature Review. 
b. Active Shooter Ammunition Load 
For this experiment, the active shooter is limited to 500 rounds. A typical 9mm 
pistol round weighs 179 grains (US Army, 1994), which is approximately equal to 
0.0255714 pounds (1 grain = 1/7000 pounds). Assuming an active shooter carried 500 9mm 
pistol rounds, this would weigh just 12.8 pounds, could be carried in a backpack, and not 
likely to prove a significant hindrance to movement (McDonald, 2019). 
c. Active Shooter Firing Range 
The active shooter’s maximum firing range is 30 feet. Though this is less than the 
absolute maximum effective range of most pistols, it simulates the idea that the active 
shooter may be communicating with his intended targets (McDonald, 2019). 
6. Bystander Assumptions 
a. Random Initial Location within Assigned Sections 
Bystanders are assigned to different sections of the building initially (as discussed 
Experimental Variables section below). However, within their areas of assignment, each 
bystander is placed randomly (McDonald, 2019). 
b. Attempt to Execute Active Shooter Protocols 
Bystanders attempt to execute active shooter protocols after realizing an active 
shooter event is taking place. These bystanders will attempt to either hide while remaining 
behind the nearest door, or flee to the nearest exit (McDonald, 2019). 
c. Panicking 
Bystanders initially exhibit random movements before executing active shooter 
protocols, as they run out of a room or towards someone they know (McDonald, 2019). 
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This helps simulate an initial onset of panic before bystanders react appropriately. Without 
JASPR, five to 10 percent of such individuals attempt to flee their room (and the building), 
while with a JASPR system, just one to two percent of such individuals attempt the same. 
7. First Responder Assumptions 
a. With JASPR 
If a JASPR system is present during the active shooting, first responders arriving at 
the location “know” where the active shooter is as they are relayed information by a 
dispatcher/operator that can operate the cameras in the building to track the active shooter. 
It is also assumed that bystanders in the vicinity of the first responders supplement them 
with additional updates on the location of the active shooter. 
b. Without JASPR 
When no JASPR system is present, first responders are restricted to updates from 
fleeing bystanders. As a consequence of this, first responders tend to pause more often and 
advance to the shooter’s location more slowly. 
8. Agent Movement Rates 
All agents initially move at 0.2 to 0.4 meters per second. However, after becoming 
aware of the active shooting event, agents increase their speed to 0.6 to 1.0 meters per 
second (McDonald, 2019).  
B. EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES 
1. Independent Variables 
The independent variables include three categorical factors: Active Shooter 
Entrance Location (with three levels), Active Shooter Suicide (yes or no), and JASPR 
Presence. The remaining five variables explored are: Active Shooter Firing Rate, Active 
Shooter Probability of Hit (p(Hit)), number of Bystanders in Cafeteria, number of 
Bystanders in Classrooms, and First Responder Response Time. Each variable, including 
its definition, range, and reasons for selection in the model are included in a small 
discussion below. 
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a. Active Shooter Entrance Location 
Most of the agent-based models of active shootings discussed in the literature 
review, including Hayes and Hayes (2014), Briggs and Kennedy (2016), Stewart (2017), 
and Lee et al. (2018), do not specifically vary the active shooter’s entrances. Anklam et al. 
(2015) is a notable exception, where the shooter is allowed to select among five entrances: 
three classrooms, an administrative office, and a school cafeteria. Although Anklam et al. 
make an admirable case for allowing CCW by the school staff or a designated first 
responder in their model regardless of the shooter’s entry location and first shot, they do 
not provide any analysis on its systematic effect on casualties.  
This model includes three different entrances available to the active shooter: an 
entrance into a large cafeteria in the middle of the model building, an entrance into a long 
hallway connecting multiple dorm rooms along the eastern end of the building, and an 
entrance into a comparatively shorter hallway connecting several classrooms along  
the western end of the building. The second floor of the USMAPS building used in the 
model and its corresponding main sections are shown by Figure 16 in the Simulation 
Layout sub-section of this chapter, along with different routes taken by the active shooter 
corresponding to each of the entrances in Figure 17, Figure 18, and Figure 19. 
b. Active Shooter Suicide 
Whether or not the active shooter suicided is treated as a binary factor in the design. 
This variable is not considered in other agent-based models, and it is likely unreasonable 
to include this variable in other earlier models found in the literature. Even so, Blair et al. 
(2014) indicated that in 44 of 104 (42.3%) active shooting events studied, the active shooter 
committed suicide. A shooter suicide possibility is included in this study to examine its 
effect on the total number of deaths and quantify how effective JASPR may or may not be 
when a shooter suicides. 
For model runs in which the shooter suicides, the shooter is programmed to cease 
firing at a uniform random time between 30 seconds and the end of the run (30 minutes), 
after his first shot. At that time, the active shooter remains in place without firing further 
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and awaits first responders at his location. This behavior simulates an active shooter 
suicide. 
c. JASPR Presence 
Determining how effective JASPR is at reducing the total number of deaths in the 
model requires examining model runs when JASPR is present and when JASPR is not 
present. As an experimental factor, JASPR is either enabled with all of its component 
systems, or it is not present at all. The placement of JASPR components was determined 
by subject matter experts at the JASPR program office. JASPR component placement is 
indicated in Figure 20. 
d. Active Shooter Firing Rate 
The active shooter’s firing rate is varied between 45 and 60 rounds per minute 
(rpm). This range attempts to mirror a semi-automatic pistol, which is the typical, and most 
powerful, firearm used by the majority of active shooters (Blair et al., 2014). Citing a single 
rate of effective fire for semi-automatic weapons is problematic as sources can vary 
considerably depending on how the phrase “effective rate of fire” is defined. For this 
model, an assumption is made to accommodate a range of three rounds every four seconds 
(45 rounds per minute) all the way up to one round fired per second (60 rounds per minute). 
The shooter’s firing rate does not imply that the shooter must fire continuously at this rate 
for the entire duration of every model replication. Rather, the shooter is allowed to fire up 
to this rate, as targets are available, within range of, and visible to, the shooter. 
e. Active Shooter Probability of Hit 
The active shooter’s probability of hitting his target, or p(Hit), ranged between 
0.25 and 0.75. Values below 0.25 are assumed to be unrealistically low, while values above 
0.75 are deemed unrealistically high.  
f. Bystanders in Cafeteria 
The number of bystanders starting in the cafeteria varied between 10 and 
240 people to simulate the ebb and flow of people filtering in and out of the cafeteria over 
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different periods of a typical day. For example, a cafeteria is typically at its busiest during 
mealtimes and typically not as busy at other times. Even so, there usually are cafeteria staff 
moving in or around the area and occasionally a student, or groups of students, may wander 
through or linger. The term “victim” is intentionally not used for this variable to avoid 
giving the impression of any manner of physical casualty in the model. Instead, the word 
“bystander” is preferred for its neutral connotation. 
g. Bystanders in Classrooms 
Like the number of bystanders starting in the cafeteria, the number of bystanders 
starting in the classrooms is varied, but ranges between zero and 40 people. And much like 
the cafeteria, this range was selected in an attempt to model the ebb and flow of people in 
and out of the classrooms section of the building.  
h. First Responder Response Time 
Police are the typical first responders to an active shooting event, though this is not 
always the case, and private security or other law enforcement personnel may sometimes 
be in a position to respond faster. As a result, the phrase “first responder” is used as a catch-
all phrase to indicate the different groups of armed responders arriving to an active shooting 
with intent to stop the active shooter. 
First Responder Response Time ranged between zero minutes and termination of 
the model run at 30 minutes. However, First Responder Response Time depended on both 
the time required for first responders to arrive at the active shooting event as well as the 
time delay between the active shooting start and the time until a call is placed to a 
dispatcher, who then dispatches first responders. This delay is further discussed under the 
conditional variables. 
i. Table of Independent Variables 
The independent variables and their ranges, or levels if they are categorical 
variables, are listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Table of Independent Variables within the ABM 
 Independent Variables Minimum Maximum Levels (categorical) 
1 AS Entrance Locations - - West, Central, East 
2 AS Suicide - - Yes, No 
3 JASPR Presence - - Yes, No 
4 AS Firing Rate 45 rnds/min 60 rnds/min - 
5 AS Probability of hit 0.25 0.75 - 
6 Bystanders in Cafeteria 10 people 240 people - 
7 Bystanders in Classrooms 0 people 40 people - 
8 First Responder Response Time 0 min 30 min -  
 
2. Conditional Variables and Response of Interest 
The remaining variables included in the ABM are the number of bystanders located 
in the dorm rooms, the cognitive delay for bystanders to recognize that an active shooter is 
in the area, and the time required to dispatch first responders to the area. These variables 
are considered conditional variables (i.e., variables that are conditionally dependent on  
one or more of the independent variables). And, while they varied during execution of  
the model, these are not systematically varied via the experimental design described in 
Section B.  
a. Bystanders in Dorm Rooms 
Bystanders in dorm rooms is defined as 340 bystanders (the maximum possible) 
minus the sum of the number of bystanders assigned to the classrooms and the cafeteria. 
This is intended to capture the movement of bystanders between different parts of the 
building throughout a normal day, reducing the number of bystanders loitering in their 
dorm rooms and increasing their numbers in other sections of the building, as is normally 
the case. This also allows a straightforward comparison of Total Deaths across the potential 
bystander locations.  
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b. Cognitive Delay + Dispatch Time 
Cognitive delay + dispatch time is defined as the time delay between bystander 
realization of an active shooting event until the time a dispatcher notifies first responders 
that an active shooting is in progress. None of the surveyed literature indicated what a 
realistic cognitive delay might be during an active shooting, especially coupled with the 
time required for a dispatcher to ascertain the active shooting location from a stressed 
bystander. Instead, an assumption is made that when JASPR is not present, the cognitive 
delay varies according to a uniform random variable with a minimum of zero and 
maximum of 30 seconds, and the dispatch delay follows a uniform random variable with 
minimum of zero and maximum of 60 seconds. When JASPR is present, it is assumed that 
there is no (zero) cognitive delay, since a gunshot detector is designed to immediately 
detect the sound of the active shooter’s gunshots, electronically notify the local dispatcher, 
and render the cognitive delay irrelevant. However, even with JASPR, the dispatch delay 
remained uniformly from 0 to 60 seconds, as this is a function of the call center procedures 
and responsiveness, and not the presence of a JASPR system. 
c. Total Deaths 
Total Deaths, the main response of interest in this study, is defined as the final tally 
of bystander deaths at the end of each replication. The response has a lower bound of zero 
(no deaths) and an upper bound of 340 (maximum number of bystanders). 
d. Table of Conditional Variables 
The dependent variables and their ranges are listed in Table 2, alongside a 





Table 2. Table of Conditional Variables within the ABM 
 Dependent Variables Minimum Maximum Descriptive Function 
1 Bystanders in Dorm Rooms 65 people 325 people 
Bystanders in dorms = 340 
- (Cafeteria + Classrooms) 
2 Cognitive Delay +  Dispatch Time 0 90 seconds 
Cognitive Delay = 0 if 
JASPR Present,  
U ~ (0,30) (secs) otherwise, 
Dispatch Time = U ~ (0, 60) 
(secs) 
 
C. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS  
The independent variables described in the previous section are systematically 
varied via an efficient design of experiment (DOE).  
A full factorial design is used for the three categorical variables. The full factorial 
design accounts for all combinations of the three levels corresponding to the Active Shooter 
Entrance Locations (classrooms, cafeteria, dorm rooms), the two levels for JASPR 
Presence (Yes or No), and the two levels for Active Shooter Suicide (Yes or No). This 
yields 12 (3 × 2 × 2) design points (DPs).  
A 125 DP second order Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) (MacCalman 
et al., 2017) samples across the remaining numerical variables. The use of the second order 
NOLH allows for an efficient and space-filling exploration of the design space, with 
negligible multicollinearity among input factors and their second order effects, and allows 
for flexible analysis goals. Additionally, the second order NOLH provides excellent space-
filling properties that enables the detection of model bias in the presence of step functions 
(MacCalman et al., 2017). 
Crossing the 12 DPs from the full factorial for the categorical variables with the 
125 DPs from the second order NOLH, yields 1,500 DPs (12 × 125). 30 independent 
replications are conducted at each DP, yielding 45,000 active shooter simulations across 
all independent variables. Each replication of the ABM produced a time series of deaths as 
well as a cumulative total. To keep file sizes manageable, deaths are reported once every 
10 time steps instead of every time step. 
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A scatterplot matrix, shown in Figure 21, shows the near-orthogonality of the 
independent numeric variables with respect to each other and the space-filling properties 
of the second order NOLH.  
 
Figure 21. Scatterplot Matrix for Numeric Independent Variables 
Figure 22 displays the corresponding correlation matrix for these independent 
variables. The correlation matrix confirms the nearly orthogonal design of the experiment, 
























4 10 22 47 53 0.32 0.56 40 120 200 6 14 30
38 
 
Figure 22. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables. 
D. MODELING AND ANALYSIS SOFTWARE 
1. ABM Software—Pythagoras 
Pythagoras is the government-owned, stochastic, time step ABM environment used 
to create the base model for both this thesis and the preceding research done by McDonald 
(2019) for the JASPR Office. Pythagoras was originally developed by Northrop Grumman 
for the U.S. Marine Corps as a medium resolution ABM software and, as such, is primarily 
designed for military modeling. For example, Pythagoras has been applied in the past  
to model how unmanned surface vehicles might perform in force protection missions 
(Cioppa et al., 2004). 
However, Pythagoras is easily adaptable for simulating active shooter incidents, 
and easily lends itself to modeling terrain, along with agent behavior, agent movement, 
agent resources, agent attributes, and interaction and communication among individual 
agents across different time steps. Pythagoras is also capable of modeling the effect of 
different weapon characteristics.  
Further details and possibilities for similar applications with Pythagoras can be 
found in Cioppa et al. (2004) and Henscheid et al. (2006). 
2. Analytical Software—JMP 
JMP is a statistical software package originally developed by SAS. JMP stores data 
in a spreadsheet like format which easily allows users to launch data visualization and 
analysis tools around the data. The visualization and analysis tools in JMP are intuitively 
created and adjusted, and the software allows for application of both routine and advanced 
statistical techniques, yet requires little-to-no programming. JMP Pro version 14.2 is used 
to perform the bulk of the analysis presented in next chapter. 
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JMP is commercial software, requiring a paid license to use. JMP is also capable 
of taking advantage of several statistics packages found among the R and Python 
programming languages. Additionally, JMP can be operated on both Windows-based and 
Mac computers. Further JMP information can be obtained at the company’s website: 
https://www.jmp.com/en_us/home.html. 
E. VARIABILITY FOR A REPRESENTATIVE “BASE” CASE 
A base case for Total Deaths is illustrated here. The base case demonstrates the 
stochastic nature of the model and suggests the role that randomness plays in the main 
response for a specific set of circumstances. In the base case, no JASPR system is present, 
the Active Shooter Entrance Location is set to a dorm room entrance, First Responder 
Response Time is set to 20 minutes, and the active shooter does not suicide during his 
rampage. Total Deaths are recorded for each of 100 model runs and summarized in the 
histogram and boxplot shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. Total Deaths Inflicted by Active Shooter: No JASPR, Dorm Room 
Entrance, No Suicide, 20-Minute Response Time 
20 40 60 80 100 120
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The histogram is bimodal: there are typically a range of Total Deaths between 30 
and 40, or else, a range of Total Deaths between 70 and 80. The random draws governing 
speed of communication or the presence of an active shooter and the effectiveness of the 
attempted lock-down procedures likely drove the difference between the bad and worse 
modes. The mean and median fall between the two modes and suggest measures of central 
tendency for Total Deaths at 62.5 or 67.5, respectively. A table of quantiles for the base 
case is shown in Table 3, providing further details on the distribution of Total Deaths.  
Table 4 offers additional summary statistics. 
Table 3. Base Case Quantiles 
100.0% maximum 123 
99.5%  123 
97.5%  112.425 
90.0%  92.9 
75.0% quartile 80 
50.0% median 67.5 
25.0% quartile 36 
10.0%  31 
2.5%  27.525 
0.5%  25 
0.0% minimum 25 
Table 4. Base Case Summary Statistics 
Mean 62.53 
Std Dev 24.79 
Std Err Mean 2.48 
Upper 95% Mean 67.45 
Lower 95% Mean 57.61 
N 100 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS 
An initial examination of the relationships between conditional and independent 
variables and the main response is displayed via a scatterplot matrix in Figure 24. The main 
response, Total Deaths, appears at the bottom left in red text and the two dependent 
variables, Bystanders in Dorm Rooms and Cognitive Delay + Dispatch Time, are noted in 
blue text.  
 
Figure 24. Scatterplot Matrix of Independent and Conditional Variables 
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The red lines indicate a standard least-squares linear fit for each of the numeric-to-
numeric variable relationships. As intended, the linear fit between independent numeric 
variables demonstrates the effect of the second order NOLH: virtually zero correlation 
between them. By virtue of the design, significant collinearity effects are avoided between 
the experiment factors and their second order terms (not displayed in Figure 24). 
Also seen at first glance are how the independent variables affect Total Deaths 
along the far left set of scatterplots. A few strong relationships are apparent, and these are 
explored in further detail in the subsequent sections. 
B. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF TOTAL DEATHS 
As the response of interest for this study, Total Deaths ranges from zero to 164, is 
unimodal with a mode of three, has mean of 17.6, median of eight, and is right skewed. 
The histogram in Figure 25 reflects the low mode and positive skew for Total Deaths over 
the 45,000 simulated active shooter incidents. 
These statistics suggest the relatively infrequent occurrence of extremely high 
numbers for Total Deaths, regardless of the impact of the other variables. The median 
indicates that runs with eight or fewer deaths are just as likely as model runs with  





Figure 25. Total Deaths Across all Independent Variables 
C. BIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF TOTAL DEATHS VERSUS INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
As the response of interest, Total Deaths is examined against the independent 
variables. First, the three categorical variables, Active Shooter Entrance Location, JASPR 
Presence, and Active Shooter Suicide are examined and compared with respect to Total 
Deaths. Then, two of the numeric variables, First Responder Response Time and the Active 
Shooter p(Hit), are investigated to quantify their impact on the mean of Total Deaths. 
Because the scatterplot matrix in Figure 24 indicates that Active Shooter Firing Rate, 
Bystanders in Cafeteria, and Bystanders in Classrooms did not have a large individual 
impact on Total Deaths, and because they are considered again in the multivariate analysis, 
we do not present their bivariate fits in this section. 
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For categorical variables, boxplots for each level are used to show the difference in 
response while scatterplots display the mean of Total Deaths versus the numeric variables. 
Displaying mean Total Deaths over a design point’s replications rather than displaying all 
Total Deaths for each of the 45,000 model runs avoids cluttering the scatterplots and 
indicates a more cleanly discernible trend in the response. 
1. Total Deaths versus Active Shooter Entrance Location 
The greatest number of deaths typically occurred when the active shooter entered 
the cafeteria section of the building and opened fire, with a corresponding median of 14. 
Likewise, there are typically fewer deaths, with median of five, when the active shooter 
entered the classroom section of the building. However, the active shooter’s selection of 
the classrooms also presented, by far, the most outliers and the greatest maximum deaths 
at 164 versus just 73 and 156 for the cafeteria and dorm room entrances, respectively.  
In contrast, the dorm room entrance held the largest count of Total Deaths at the 75th 
percentile (Q3), but the fewest outliers compared to the previous entrances. 
Figure 26 displays three different boxplots reflecting the differences in Total Deaths 
that correspond with each of the three Active Shooter Entrance Locations. They show 
dramatic, and slightly unexpected, differences in Total Deaths by location. The boxplots 
are color coded blue, green and purple, to align with the cafeteria, classroom, and dorm 
room section shading for the building map in Figures 16, 17, and 18 from the Methodology 
chapter; outliers are jittered for each boxplot. The upper right corner associated with each 
boxplot contains a five-number summary for Total Deaths by location. 
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Figure 26. Total Deaths by Active Shooter Entrance Location  
(Classrooms, Cafeteria, Dorm Rooms) 
2. Total Deaths versus Active Shooter Suicide 
Total Deaths is also influenced heavily by Active Shooter Suicide after the active 
shooter’s first shot is fired. Again, the active shooter committed suicide according to a 
uniform random variable between zero and 30 minutes after the time of the first shot. 
Unsurprisingly, there are fewer deaths when the active shooter commits suicide under this 
assumption. Figure 27 quantifies this with a median number of deaths at five when the 
active shooter suicided compared to 13 when the active shooter does not.  
46 
 
Figure 27. Total Deaths by Active Shooter Suicide 
Additionally, both sets of data show relatively different theoretical upper limits or 
top whiskers (i.e., the median + 1.5 × the interquartile range [IQR]); scenarios without AS 
suicides have a maximum of 71, while scenarios with AS suicides have a maximum of 27, 
before observations are classified as outliers. While outlier classification is not necessarily 
of direct interest because the underlying data is highly skewed, the differences in IQR show 
variability in Total Deaths is substantially lower in scenarios with Active Shooter Suicide. 
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3. Total Deaths versus JASPR Presence 
Figure 28 indicates Total Deaths by JASPR Presence with two boxplots and jittered 
outliers and quartiles at the top right for each plot. The boxplots show a clear difference in 
outcomes here, with fewer Total Deaths when JASPR is present. This result suggests a 
direct answer to the main research question on whether JASPR is, in fact, effective at 
reducing deaths.  
 
Figure 28. Total Deaths by JASPR Presence (Yes or No) 
When JASPR is present, three deaths, six deaths, and 10 deaths occurred at Q1, Q2, 
and Q3, respectively; while six, 15 and 42 deaths occurred at Q1, Q2, and Q3, respectively, 
when JASPR is not. 
48 
4. Mean Total Deaths versus Active Shooter p(Hit) 
The Exploratory Data Analysis section’s scatterplot (Figure 24) suggests a 
moderate-to-strong relationship between mean Total Deaths and Active Shooter p(Hit) in 
the presence of all the other input factors. A quadratic regression is fit as it provides a better 
fit than a linear regression and helps quantify the relationship between the variables. The 
concavity of the fit indicates that as the active shooter’s p(Hit) increases, mean Total 
Deaths increases, though the increases to mean Total Deaths are marginally decreasing. 
Figure 29 shows this regression against a scatterplot of mean Total Deaths and Active 
Shooter p(Hit), coupled with its equation, root mean squared error, and its R2 value in the 
upper left; the shaded blue area indicates its 95% confidence interval around the regression. 
 
Figure 29. Mean Total Deaths versus Active Shooter p(Hit) 
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5. Mean Total Deaths versus First Responder Response Time 
Like mean Total Deaths and Active Shooter p(Hit), the Exploratory Data Analysis 
section’s scatterplot (Figure 24) suggests a moderate-to-strong relationship between mean 
Total Deaths and First Responder Response Time while all other factors are varying.  
A cubic, rather than quadratic, regression is selected to fit the data points here and capture 
the comparatively sharper increase in mean Total Deaths in the first few minutes of 
response time, the leveling off of mean Total Deaths afterward, and then the acceleration 
of mean Total Deaths as First Responder Response Time increases further. Figure 30 
displays a scatterplot of mean Total Deaths across First Responder Response Times, along 
with the cubic regression equation, root mean squared error and the regression R2 in the 
upper left; the 95% confidence interval for the regression is shown by the shaded blue area. 
 
Figure 30. Mean Total Deaths versus First Responder Response Time 
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The graph suggests that an inflection point occurs just past 12 minutes, implying 
that as the First Responder Response Time lags beyond this time, the average number of 
deaths during model runs tends to become exponentially greater.  
D. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF TOTAL DEATHS VERSUS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1. Estimating Mean Total Deaths with Stepwise Regression 
A stepwise regression analysis of the independent variables is run to show the effect 
of each variable, or combination of variables, on mean Total Deaths. All main effects, two-
way interactions, quadratic terms, three-way interactions, and cubic terms were eligible for 
inclusion in the stepwise model. The initial regression model fit shows that a square root 
transformation of the response variable makes the residual variance more homogenous. 
The stepwise regression in Figure 31 indicates this transformation with the regression line 
in red, coupled with a 95% confidence interval in the shaded red area. The square root of 
Mean Total Deaths at each DP is indicated by a point and a horizontal blue line indicates 
the overall mean, regardless of DP, at approximately the 3.71 deaths0.5. 
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Figure 31. Actual versus Predicted Square Root of Mean Total Deaths 
The regression residuals for the square root transformation of mean Total Deaths 
shows roughly equal variance across predicted values in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32. Residual Plot for Square Root of Mean Total Death Regression 
However, a normal quantile plot of the regression’s residuals, shown in Figure 33, 
suggests that the residuals approach, but fail to achieve, a normal distribution, due to their 
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(Lilliefors, 1967). This means that the p-values for tests of significance in the regression 
are not precise.  
 
Figure 33. QQ-Plot for √(Mean Total Deaths) 
The regression attained an adjusted R2 value of 0.846, captured in Table 5, meaning 
that the regression explains nearly 85% of the variability of the summarized data. 
Table 5. Stepwise Regression—Summary of Fit Statistics. 
Statistic Value 
R2 0.848 
R2 Adjusted 0.846 
Root Mean Square Error 0.768 














Table 6 lists the terms included by the stepwise regression in decreasing order of 
importance. Several key insights may be gleaned from this list of terms: First, JASPR 
Presence is identified as the factor with the highest t ratio, indicating that it is the most 
statistically significant predictor of mean Total Deaths throughout the model. Second, 
Active Shooter Entrance (“Shooter Ingress” in Table 6) has the next highest impact.  
Active Shooter suicide, then the model’s first interaction, between the cafeteria entrance 
and JASPR Presence, are the next most influential. The stepwise regression includes only 
two of the numeric variables, First Responder Response Time and Active Shooter p(Hit), 
reinforcing the results previously seen in the scatterplot matrix from Figure 24.  
In fact, the first numeric variable identified by the regression as significant is First 
Responder Response Time (“Response Time” in Table 6), fifth in the list of sorted 
parameter estimates. 
Table 6. Stepwise Regression—Parameter Estimates (Sorted) 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
JASPR Presence [No] 1.0337292 0.019842 52.10 <.0001* 
Shooter Ingress [Classrooms]  -0.945328 0.028061  -33.69 <.0001* 
Shooter Suicide [No] 0.6331359 0.019842 31.91 <.0001* 
Shooter Ingress [Dining]*JASPR Presence [No]  -0.81703 0.028061  -29.12 <.0001* 
Response Time (min) 0.0507541 0.002275 22.31 <.0001* 
JASPR Presence [No]*Shooter Suicide [No] 0.3461098 0.019842 17.44 <.0001* 
AS P(hit) 1.9385093 0.135834 14.27 <.0001* 
Shooter Ingress [Classrooms]*JASPR Presence [No]  -0.326551 0.028061  -11.64 <.0001* 
JASPR Presence [No]*(Response Time (min)-15.008) 0.0232239 0.002275 10.21 <.0001* 
Shooter Ingress [Dining]*JASPR Presence [No]*Shooter Suicide 
[No] 
 -0.261759 0.028061  -9.33 <.0001* 
Shooter Suicide [No]*(Response Time (min)-15.008) 0.0168615 0.002275 7.41 <.0001* 
Shooter Ingress [Dining] 0.180361 0.028061 6.43 <.0001* 
Shooter Ingress [Classrooms]*(AS p(Hit)-0.49992)  -1.152506 0.192098  -6.00 <.0001* 
JASPR Presence [No]*(AS P(hit)-0.49992) 0.6799759 0.135834 5.01 <.0001* 
Shooter Ingress [Dining]*(AS p(Hit)-0.49992) 0.87602 0.192098 4.56 <.0001* 
Shooter Ingress [Classrooms]*JASPR Presence [No]*Shooter 
Suicide [No] 
 -0.110631 0.028061  -3.94 <.0001* 
Shooter Ingress [Classrooms]*Shooter Suicide [No]  -0.109668 0.028061  -3.91 <.0001* 
Shooter Ingress [Dining]*JASPR Presence [No]*(AS p(Hit)-
0.49992) 
 -0.613127 0.192098  -3.19 0.0014* 
Shooter Ingress [Dining]*Shooter Suicide [No]  -0.070031 0.028061  -2.50 0.0127* 
Shooter Ingress [Classrooms]*JASPR Presence [No]*(AS p(Hit)-
0.49992) 
 -0.351891 0.192098  -1.83 0.0672 
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JMP also offers a prediction profile tool, illustrated in Figure 34, indicating how 
each of the main effects from the stepwise regression affects the mean Total Deaths 
response. The prediction profile’s vertical cross-hairs align with different values for each 
of the included variables, while the horizontal cross-hairs provide the mean for Total 
Deaths at those settings of the included variables. 
The prediction profile shows how JASPR Presence and Active Shooter Suicide 
clearly decrease mean Total Deaths, while First Responder Response Time and Active 
Shooter p(Hit) increase mean Total Deaths over their respective ranges. We also see that 
Active Shooter Entrance has a dramatic effect on mean Total Deaths and dorm room entry 
is associated with the highest death count. 
 
Figure 34. JMP Prediction Profile for the Regression on Mean Total Deaths 
Additionally, Figure 35 displays the set of interaction profiles for each of the two-
way interactions in the regression model. The presence of non-parallel lines is a visual 
indicator of an interaction between two variables, meaning that the effect of one variable 
depends on the value of the variable it is interacting with. For example, one of the stronger 
interactions, the interaction between JASPR Presence and Response Time, is visually 
captured with either the first row, third column (or with the third row, first column—these 
are complementary). When JASPR is present (blue line), then the response time does not 
have a strong impact on deaths, but when JASPR is not present (red line), then longer 
























Figure 35. Interactions between Independent Variables 
Similarly, JASPR Presence and Active Shooter Entrance Location (first row, fifth 
column) is identified by the stepwise regression as the strongest of the interaction effects. 
The disparity between mean Total Deaths depending on entrance location and JASPR 
Presence is stark, with the dorm room entrance showing the largest difference in deaths 
between with and without JASPR. 
2. Estimating Mean Total Deaths with a Partition Tree 
Next, a partition tree was fit, to capture the relationships between independent 
variables and the response. Partition trees are generally considered to complement the 
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jumps in the response, interaction arise naturally, and display results in an intuitive easy-
to-understand form. The most impactful independent variables in a decision tree are 
generally nested higher, while the less important variables are nested lower.  
A relatively compact tree with high explanatory power across five splits (or 
branches) is displayed in Figure 36. The tree was constructed using cross-validation and 
yielded a final R2 value of 0.74. While every additional split in a partition tree generally 
increases the tree’s explanatory power, with each split, the possibility of overfitting the tree 
to the data increases.  
 
Figure 36. Partition Tree for Mean Total Deaths 
A few performance metrics for this partition tree, including R2, RMSE, the total 
number of observations or DPs (N), number of splits, and Akaike Information Criterion 
(AICc) are captured in Table 7. 
Table 7. Decision Tree—Metrics on Five Splits. 
R2 RMSE N Number of Splits AICc 


















































































With every split of the data by the partition tree, the tree’s R2 increases, though the 
tree experiences diminishing returns to this statistic after the fourth split. Assuming splits 
of the tree continued, the tree’s marginally increasing R2 is shown in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37. Partition Tree Split History by R2 
The partition tree complements and generally confirms the results of the regression, 
with respect to the most critical variables. JASPR Presence, followed by Active Shooter 
Entrance Location, Active Shooter Suicide, and then First Responder Response Times are 
the most impactful variables overall. The interpretation of the first split is that for the 
750 cases in which JASPR is present, there are 8.2 deaths on average, but for the 750 cases 
in which JASPR is not present, the average deaths jumped to 27.1. At each split, the 
algorithm seeks to split on the factor and split point that separates the data as much as 
possible with respect to mean Total Deaths.  
The tree shows that the difference in mean Total Deaths is relatively large: there 
are just 4.9 mean Total Deaths in a best-case scenario (lower left leaf) with JASPR Presence 
and the active shooter enters into either the classrooms or dorm rooms, while in a worst-
case scenario (lower right leaf) there are an average of 68.5 Total Deaths without JASPR 
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3. Random Forest Analysis 
Since the partition tree method is greedy, can be particularly sensitive to the 
underlying data, and can fail to capture some important relationships, it is useful to run a 
random forest of individual partition trees. Running a bootstrapped random forest of 100 
(or more) decision trees, and averaging results across them, provides a more robust method 
for ranking the independent variables by contribution to Total Deaths. The result of the 
random forest performed is shown in Table 8. The figure displays each of the independent 
variables under the “Predictor” column, a “Contribution” column indicating the total 
amount (sum of squares) each variable contributed to the random forest, the proportional 
amount contributed to the random forest under the “Portion” column, and a ranking by total 
proportion of contribution for each variable under the “Rank” column.  
Table 8. Total Deaths Variance Explained 
 
The results vary slightly with each generation of a random forest due to its inherent 
randomness, but are extremely consistent across each generation. Moreover, they align 
well with the results of previous analyses. The categorical variables, JASPR Presence, 
Shooter Entrance, and Shooter Suicide, have the greatest influence on Total Deaths. The 
remaining continuous independent variables, First Responder Response Time, Active 
Shooter p(Hit), Bystanders in Cafeteria, Bystanders in Classrooms, and Active Shooter 
Firing Rate, contribute substantially less. In point of fact, the top three variables account 
for nearly 88% of the explained variance around Total Deaths, while the remaining five 
variables all together explain just over 12%. 
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4. Total Deaths versus Categorical Variables (Active Shooter Entrance, 
JASPR Presence, Active Shooter Suicide) 
All previous analysis suggests that each of the categorical variables has a strong 
impact on the response, and the regression includes a significant three-way interaction 
between them. Total Deaths per each combination of these variables is explored via a set 
of boxplots. Figure 38 displays these boxplots, separating them by JASPR Presence with 
the first set of six on the left showing Total Deaths without JASPR Presence and the second 
set of six on the right showing Total Deaths with JASPR Presence. Each of these sets of 
six are further separated by Active Shooter Entrance Location, with colors corresponding 
to those identified in the Methodology chapter. Each subset of boxplots is separated a third 
time, with a “No” or “Yes” indicating Total Deaths by Active Shooter Suicide. 
 
Figure 38. Total Deaths versus the Three Categorical Variables. 
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Figure 38 captures the sometimes-dramatic differences in Total Deaths depending 
on these categorical variables and also offers a few insights into their relationships.  
First, differences in Total Deaths depends heavily on JASPR Presence. A visual 
comparison of the left half of the figure against the right half of the figure provides ample 
evidence that the presence of a JASPR system powerfully affects the variable of interest. 
Second, Figure 38 expresses how critical an active shooter’s entrance location is when 
determining Total Deaths, both with and without the presence of a JASPR system. For 
example, the Total Deaths in a dorm room entrance scenario with JASPR compared to a 
dorm room entrance scenario without JASPR is relatively high. However, the difference in 
Total Deaths for a cafeteria entrance scenario with and without JASPR is comparatively 
far less. Finally, the active shooter’s suicide reduces Total Deaths by roughly the same 
proportions, depending on the shooter’s entrance and the presence of JASPR.  
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VI. DISCUSSION 
A. JASPR EFFECTIVENESS 
The analysis performed suggests that JASPR is, overall, extremely effective in 
reducing the total number of deaths. However, JASPR’s effectiveness depends heavily on 
the active shooter’s entrance preference and decision to suicide or not. Other independent 
variables tested within the model affected the total number of deaths by the end of each run 
as well, though they did so to a much lesser extent. Figure 28, “Total Deaths by JASPR 
Presence,” presents clear evidence that a JASPR presence dramatically reduces Total 
Deaths, regardless of other variables. The boxplot for Total Deaths, discussed in more 
detail in the Results and Analysis chapter, demonstrates the obvious reduction in Total 
Deaths when JASPR is present and the difference is stark. This evidence is echoed again, 
though with more detail, in Figure 38 (Total Deaths versus All Categorical Variables 
[Active Shooter Entrance, JASPR Presence, & Active Shooter Suicide]). The figure shows 
that the difference in Total Deaths is greatest when the AS entered at the dorm room 
entrance, failed to suicide, and no JASPR is present compared to the same set of 
circumstances when JASPR was present. Moreover, repeated construction of a random 
forest consistently demonstrated that JASPR presence is the single most discriminatory 
factor in determining the extent of Total Deaths. Finally, the partition tree presented for 
Total Deaths, perhaps unsurprisingly after the results of the random forest, shows that 
JASPR presence is the most important factor. A claim that JASPR may be the single most 
important variable for determining total fatalities in a real-world scenario, at least insofar 
as the model reflects the circumstances and physical layout of the USMAPS building at 
West Point, NY, seems reasonable at this point. 
1. Circumstances where JASPR Was Least Effective 
A simple examination of the evidence presented in the Results and Analysis chapter 
indicates that JASPR is least effective when the active shooter begins firing in the cafeteria. 
The difference in Total Deaths between JASPR and non-JASPR scenarios within the 
cafeteria is by far the smallest when compared to the dorm room and classroom entrances. 
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This may be due to the multiple exits available, the large number of people the cafeteria 
typically accommodates, and a likely much smaller cognitive delay among the personnel 
in immediate and obvious danger when an active shooter opens fire on a crowd. The 
immediate sound and sight of an active shooter firing at a crowd would reasonably cause a 
bystander to summon the local first responders faster, and as a consequence, end the 
shooting more quickly. Further, as the active shooter reveals himself at once with the first 
shot in a crowd, the personnel in the remainder of the building would likely be notified—
either through one of JASPR’s alert mechanisms (the LED marquee, an alert beacon, a 
flashing wall light, etc.), through one of the building’s broadcast systems, or possibly even 
word-of-mouth as people flee away from the shooter. 
JASPR is generally more effective at reducing Total Deaths when the active shooter 
enters the classrooms section of the building, compared to entry within the cafeteria section 
of the building. Unlike scenarios where the active shooter opens fire in the cafeteria, the 
classrooms did not typically hold as many bystanders and are less dense in comparison. 
However, it requires just one bystander to realize a shooting is in progress, bypass the 
active shooter if they are in the same classroom, and activate the emergency duress button 
in the hallway’s center. Additionally, five of the eight total classrooms shared entrances 
with adjoining classrooms, allowing students in classrooms with double entrances 
additional opportunities to avoid the active shooter. An active shooter opening fire in the 
first classroom adjacent to his starting point would have alerted students in the adjacent 
classroom. At least in this model, shared entrances benefitted bystanders in the classrooms 
since each classroom has an additional exit. Other bystanders outside a classroom may 
overhear the shooting in progress and activate JASPR by the same method. Once JASPR 
is activated, it automatically triggers door locks preventing entry into a location. These 
locked doors prevent or dramatically slow down the active shooter from entering more 
classrooms and continuing to kill. 
2. Circumstances where JASPR Was Most Effective 
The dorm room scenarios showcase JASPR at its most effective. Figure 23 captures 
the relatively extreme differences in Total Deaths for dorm room scenarios with JASPR 
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versus those without JASPR. The layout of the dorm room section of the building is similar 
to the classrooms section, but far more compartmentalized and with an even smaller 
potential concentration of people per room. The results around the dorm rooms are a bit 
unexpected: they offer limited exposure of a few bystanders at a time to the active shooter 
rather than a much larger set of targets such as the cafeteria or the classrooms might offer. 
But this works to the shooter’s advantage since bystanders in adjacent rooms are typically 
unaware of the active shooter’s presence and therefore incapable of alerting others, whether 
through activation of a duress button or by word-of-mouth.  
Moreover, bystanders confronted with an active shooter have limited reaction time 
and only one entrance or exit. Bystanders walking the dorm room hallway also have limited 
ability to alert the remainder of the building, much less the individual or set of individuals 
within each dormitory room along this section of the building. These individuals are also 
targets for the active shooter and are often forced to flee first before they can react and 
summon first responders. The introduction of JASPR turns this set of circumstances on its 
head: activating JASPR, and consequently the automatic door locks associated with 
JASPR, blocks active shooter access into individual dorm rooms, and dramatically reduces 
Total Deaths from that point forward. Just as critically, the presence of emergency duress 
buttons allows fleeing bystanders to activate JASPR and alert the entire dorm room wing 
of the building at once.  
B. LIMITATIONS 
1. External Validity 
In the most general sense, this study’s external validity, the “problems of 
generalizing from the experiment to a larger population” (Bailey, 1994) should be 
questioned. That is, although the results of the agent-based model may be perfectly 
appropriate for the specific circumstances they model, do these results extend to other 
similar locations?  This study is necessarily limited in scope to study the efficacy of JASPR 
in one location and several variables under controlled circumstances for easy study. 
However, until further research can verify that this model’s results apply more broadly, 
this experiment can only suggest that they do. 
2. JASPR Assumptions
Assumptions made in the model about JASPR also present limitations to the 
analysis. JASPR, as a system of active shooter defeat mechanisms, is either “on” or “off” 
for the model runs used in this analysis. This allows JASPR to bring to bear every possible 
mechanism at its disposal during an active shooting, or not. This inhibited a more nuanced 
analysis of JASPR effectiveness.  
3. Casualties versus Fatalities
Only fatalities are recorded in this experiment, though this is obviously not a 
realistic assumption for most active shootings. However, differentiating between victims 
by whether they are immediately killed, or not, is not necessarily a function of JASPR’s 
presence, and so is deemed superfluous for this study. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH
Many of the suggested areas for future research bear on the limitations discussed in
the previous section. 
1. Expanding Physical Layout of Model
This study uses the second floor layout of the USMAPS building located at West 
Point, NY. Future studies might examine models corresponding with different structures, 
or even move the model to an outdoor scenario. Several of JASPR’s active shooter defeat 
mechanisms rely on, or are optimally designed to function in, an indoor setting. 
Experimenting with the effectiveness of each of these mechanisms over multiple different 
settings would likely refine and add to existing research on active shooter 
defeat mechanisms. Mirroring other locations while studying JASPR’s efficiency in an 





Incorporating additional variables into the model for study is another avenue for 
future research. For example, the total number of injuries went unexamined in this study. 
Because only total fatalities are studied, and not total casualties, future research might 
examine the total casualty rate. The total casualty rate is likely higher than simply the Total 
Deaths variable presented here, and it may suggest a different employment for JASPR. 
First Responder Response Times in conjunction with JASPR Presence might also study 
how many additional lives are saved by the timely arrival of medical first responders. 
3. Scope of Current Variables
Similarly, improving how relationships between the independent and/or conditional 
variables in this study might prove fruitful. For example, Active Shooter p(Hit) and Active 
Shooter Firing Rate almost certainly share an inverse relationship, but the tradeoff between 
the two variables is not known, and how they should interact during an active shooting in 
the hands of a shooter who may have either little, or extreme, skill in handling a firearm 
would have been too difficult to model. Additionally, mapping Total Deaths to recorded 
First Responder Response Times to alarms at West Point, NY, may yield further insights 
into JASPR effectiveness. These response times, along with Blair et al.’s (2014) study of 
response times to active shootings between 2000 and 2010 are provided in Figure 39 and 
Figure 40, respectively, in the Appendix. 
4. Cost Estimation of JASPR
Finally, any serious employment of the JASPR system, or subset of its systems, 
requires a cost estimate of this system. After such an analysis is completed, a more 
informed cost-benefit analysis might take place into how to most efficiently employ JASPR 
to prevent needless casualties. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This study examines how effective JASPR, a suite of active shooting defeat 
mechanisms, may be at reducing the total fatalities in a simulated environment. An agent-
based model simulating an active shooting on the second floor of the USMAPS building at 
West Point, NY, was created to assess this. Several variables that potentially impact the 
behavior of the active shooter are examined, including the shooter’s entrance choice, 
whether the shooter suicides at some time after the first shot, rate of fire, and the shooter’s 
p(Hit). The model also incorporates varying levels of bystanders, differing First Responder 
Response Times after dispatch, reaction time by the bystanders, and of course whether 
JASPR is present at the time of the shooting.  
The results from the model suggest that JASPR significantly reduces the total 
number of deaths, depending on the set of circumstances around the shooting. JASPR is at 
its most effective when the active shooter opens fire within the dorm room section of the 
building. This is likely due to the isolation of the bystanders and their general inability to 
call for help or alert other people in the area to the presence of a shooter. JASPR provides 
a quick and effective way to summon first responders, alert the remainder of the building, 
and automatically lock all door room doors when an active shooter is present. JASPR is 
least effective when the active shooter opens fire on the set of bystanders within the 
cafeteria. The active shooter announces himself with the first shot to a large number of 
people in these cases, and has limited time and opportunity to target a subset of the cafeteria 
bystanders before they flee out of range. Active shootings that begin in the classroom 
section of the building still show JASPR as a marginally effectively tool in reducing the 
number of Total Deaths in the model. Compared with the dorm-room setting, the active 
shooter has larger crowds to fire on, but the larger number of bystanders also makes it more 
likely that someone will manually trigger JASPR or that gunshot detector will 
automatically trigger JASPR. 
Although the results presented in this study are limited to the model they are based 
on, JASPR’s potential in this study suggests more research into a set of active shooter 
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defeat mechanisms is warranted. Ultimately, such research may reduce the scale of such 
horrific events—and, at least in some cases, prevent them. 
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APPENDIX 
A. EMERGENCY ALARM RESPONSE TIMES AT WEST POINT, NY 
The West Point, NY, Military Police (MPs) were gracious enough to supply their 
recorded response times to emergency alarms at West Point (Correira, K. & Cruz, P., email 
to author, February 28, 2020). This data reflects 127 responses to emergency alarms 
including fire alarms, elevator distress calls, intrusion detection alarms, and other similar 
calls. Figure 39 displays a histogram and boxplot of this data, coupled with a suggested 
beta distribution. This distribution would likely prove useful for modeling future active 
shooter defeat systems. 
 
 Suggested Beta Distribution 
Figure 39. Histogram of Actual First Responder Response Times  
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Table 9 provides the suggested beta distribution parameters associated with  
Figure 39. 
Table 9. Suggested Beta Distribution Parameters 
Type Parameter Estimate Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Shape α 2.2208761 1.7410753 2.7870941 
Shape β 7.9659792 6.1018666 10.171013 
Threshold θ 0.5   
Scale σ 20   
 
 
B. FIRST RESPONDER RESPONSE TIMES TO ACTIVE SHOOTER 
EVENTS 
In Blair et al’s (2014) study of 110 active shootings between 2000 and 2012, the 
authors characterized their associated police response times with the histogram shown in 
Figure 40. 
 
Figure 40. Police Response Time. Source: Blair et al. (2014). 
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